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Chinese Report on US Office of Secretary of Defence (OSD) opinion of Chinese Military & Security Developments...解放军报批美涉华军力报告 称内容抄自中国网友

2013年05月08日00:25

来源：解放军报 作者：庞清杰

原标题 [美发中国军力报告再为两军关系“添堵”]

美军参联会主席登普西前脚刚从中国离开，美国防部5月6日就抛出了2013年度中国军力报告，着实给向好的中美关系“添了一把堵”。

　　近年来，美国防部每年都会发表一份中国军力报告，对中国军力发展和战略意图说三道四，甚至不负责任地主观臆测。对于报告内容的来源，正如许多专家指出的那样，大多是美国一些粗懂中文的所谓专家，从中国军事网站的论坛上“Ctrl+C”“Ctrl+V”的结果。论坛上的东西，多来自网友的揣测和臆想，美国防部竟将之作为根据所在，真是滑天下之大稽！

　　今年的报告在许多方面与以往的版本差别不大：重点关注内容还是中国海空力量的发展及中国所谓“反介入/区域拒止”能力的增强；总体基调仍是“中国军力发展很快”“中国军力发展和战略意图不透明”“中国是个威胁”等。当然，毕竟是冷饭热炒，今年的报告也加入了一些新的“作料”，也算是“与时俱进”了。如“爆料”多种中国新型武器的发展状态和性能评估、对中日钓鱼岛争端给予重点关注、进一步渲染所谓的中国网络威胁等。

Rough Mandarin Chinese Translation:

Original title [ hair China Military Power Report for the relations between the two armed forces "clogging up" ]

          Page 1: copied from Chinese netizens Page 2: Report extremely irresponsible accusations against China Page 3: 2013 China Military Power Report icon Page 4: show the coverage of the People's Liberation Army strategic strike force 5: show the distribution of the seven Military Region of the People's Liberation Army air force

　　In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense every year issued a military report, to make irresponsible remarks on China's military development and strategic intent even irresponsibly guesswork. The source for the content of the report, As Many experts point out, most of the U.S. crude understand Chinese so-called experts "Ctrl + C" "Ctrl + V" results from the Chinese military website forum. Something on the forum, and more from the users speculation and conjecture, trying to shift the U.S. Department of Defense as a basis where, really slippery ridiculous to!

　　This year's report is in many ways the previous version is not very different: the focus on the content or the development of China's naval and air forces and the so-called "anti-access / area denial" capacity enhancement; overall tone is still China's military development soon " "China's military development and strategic intent opaque" "China is a threat. Of course, after all, left-enthusiastically participated in this year's report also added some new "spice", can be considered the "Times". Such as "broke" the state of development and performance evaluation of a variety of new weapons, to give priority attention to the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, further renders the so-called Chinese cyber threats.

　　与此同时，报告对中国的指责也极不负责任。以所谓的“中国军力不透明”为例，若按联合国的规定，中国军事透明早已达标，且中国刚刚发表的国防白皮书，正式公开了人民解放军陆军18个集团军的番号、陆军机动作战部队和海军、空军的人数等，“不透明”一说真不知从何谈起。另外，抛开报告的内容不谈，美国每年例行发表中国军力报告的行为，完全是对中国内政的粗暴干涉。中国已多次强调中国军事力量的发展是防御性的。试问，中国不针对任何国家加强国防和军队建设，又与美国何干？

　　美国如此这般揣测和指责中国军事力量的发展和战略意图，动机不言自明。一方面，渲染“中国军事威胁论”可挑拨中国与其他国家，尤其是与周边国家之间的关系，借此牵制中国，渔翁得利。另一方面，美国大肆鼓吹中国军力威胁，与其国内利益集团和军火商的推动不无关系，估计现在美国的军火商们已经摩拳擦掌准备数钱了。

　　此番发表中国军力报告，再次表明美国仍在以冷战思维和零和眼光看待两军关系，这对于发展“平等互利、合作共赢”的中美新型军事关系无疑是不可取的。事实上，此前美国已采取了一些有益于两军关系发展的举措，如与中国护航编队在亚丁湾海域举行反海盗联合演练、邀请中国参加2014年度环太平洋军事演习等。希望美国能以两军关系发展大局为要，沿着这种积极的趋势走下去，停止对中国的无端指责和揣测，不要时不时给两军关系“添堵”！

　　Data for: 2013 China Military Power Report shows in schematic form the coverage of the People's Liberation Army air defense strength and short-range ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Strait. [Save to album]

　　At the same time, the report extremely irresponsible accusations against China. To the so-called "China's military power opaque, for example, by the provisions of the United Nations, the Chinese military transparency has long been standard, China's defense white paper just published a formal public designation of the People's Liberation Army 18 Army Army Tactical Operations Forces and Navy, the number of Air Force, "opaque" I really do not know where to talk about. In addition, the content of the report aside aside each year in the United States routinely published the behavior of the Chinese Military Power Report, totally gross interference in China's internal affairs. China has repeatedly stressed that the development of China's military is defensive in nature. Ask, is not directed against any country to strengthen national defense and army building, but also with the United States ware?

　　This kind of speculation and accusations development and strategic intent of China's military power, the motivation is not self-evident. The one hand, the rendering "China military threat theory" to sow discord between China and other countries, especially the relationship between the neighboring countries to contain China, play off. On the other hand, the United States trumpeted China's military threat to promote its domestic interest groups and arms dealers are not unrelated, it is estimated that U.S. arms manufacturers are already gearing up to count the money.

　　This time, China Military Power Report, shows once again that the United States is still the Cold War mentality and zero-sum vision look at the relations between the two armed forces, which undoubtedly is not desirable for the development of "equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation", the new Sino-US military relations. In fact, after the U.S. has taken a number of beneficial relations between the two armed forces development initiatives, such as the Chinese escort fleet in the Gulf of Aden to hold joint anti-piracy drills to invite China to participate in the 2014 annual military exercises in the Pacific Rim. I hope the United States to the overall situation of the development of relations between the two armed forces to go along this positive trend, stop groundless accusations and speculation, not from time to time to the relations between the two armed forces "clogging up"!

Source… http://mil.sohu.com/20130508/n3752018817.shtml

全球网络战：蓝军红军谁主沉浮

2013-3-01 14:07  来源：南方周末

 　　美国网络战中心 （资料图片）细数各国军事网络大军

中国的互联网被很多境外的黑客组织、机构当成一个实验场。

　　攻防此消彼长，斗争没有止境，在网军、网络安全方面，中国还落后于西方大国。改变这种局面，需要整合和协调各种优势资源。

　　我们尽量扬长避短，杀木马、堵后门、防“蜂群”，创造一些行之有效的杀手锏。在整体不如别人的情况下，还是可以打胜仗。

　　中国应积极争取国际话语权，参与互联网安全国际规则的讨论和制定，禁止使用大规模网络杀伤武器。

　　日本警察厅2011年7月11日宣布，其官网在当日凌晨遭受3个多小时网络攻击，无法登录。在媒体近年铺天盖地的报道中，网络战浮上水面。

　　5月中旬，美国出台了由总统奥巴马撰写前言的战略文件《网络空间国际战略报告》，首次清晰制定了美国针对网络空间的全盘国际政策，将网络安全提升到与经济安全和军事安全同等重要的位置。

　　“这一步不是轻易迈出的，美国觉得自己在网络军备竞赛中已经有底气了。”解放军信息战知名专家叶征告诉南方周末记者。

　　不知是否巧合，该报告问世9天后，中国透露存在“网络蓝军”。未来的网络战将怎么打？中国的网络对抗实力究竟如何？我们该如何应对信息时代网络空间的博弈？

Global network warfare: Blue Army Red Army Decisive Force

2013-3-01 14:07 Source: Southern Weekend

　　U.S. network warfare center (picture)

Around the countries in military networks army

　China 's Internet outside hacker organizations, institutions as an experimental field.

　　Offensive and defensive counter-balance, the struggle is never-ending, Cyber Army, network security, China is still lagging behind the Western powers. Change this situation, the need to integrate and coordinate the various advantages of resources.

　　We try to avoid weaknesses, kill the Trojan blocking the back door, anti-"swarm" to create effective killer. In the case of a whole as well as others, can still win the war.

　　China should actively seek international voice and participate in the discussion and formulation of the rules of the Internet Security International, prohibit the use of large-scale networks destruction weapons.

　　Japan's National Police Agency announced on July 11, 2011, its official website in cyber attacks suffered more than three hours in the early morning the day and can not log on. Network warfare surfaced in the media in recent years, the overwhelming coverage.

　　In mid-May, the United States issued a foreword by President Barack Obama's strategy paper "cyberspace International strategy report, for the first time developed a comprehensive international policy of the United States for cyberspace to enhance network security to economic security and military security equally important position.

　　"This step is not easy to step, the United States felt in the network arms race has clout. "PLA information warfare-known experts the lobulation told reporters.

　　Whether by coincidence, the report come out nine days after China revealed the existence of the "network the Blues. The future networks warrior how to play? Chinese network confrontation strength of exactly how? How do we deal with the information age cyberspace Game?

Pictured British participation in the "Digital Storm III" cyber attack exercises.

　　虚拟空间进行的战争，近似于《盗梦空间》中的场景：敌方接入某国的交通信号控制系统，在马路南北、东西向同时开绿灯，连环大撞车发生，交通瘫痪；全城停电、断水、停气，基础设施瘫痪，居民生活陷入绝境。“如果广州停上两天水，那绝对不是拉上一车矿泉水救灾那么简单。停电更会让一两千万人叫天天不应，叫地地不灵。”一位不愿具名的解放军高级将领对南方周末记者说，各国基于“核威慑”概念，已经开始构建各自的“网络威慑”体系。

　　发生在网络空间的战争，颠覆了传统战争理念，模糊了战争与和平时期的分野。“过去你的战船到我的领海开火，你的作战飞机飞进我的领空开火，我就认为是对我宣战。现在每天都在打网络化的战争，谁是战士？打到什么规模算是宣战？”国防大学教授司光亚认为，这是国家无形的新边疆，未来的战争将会围绕它展开，谁掌握了制网权，谁就掌握了战争的主动权。

　　在这场竞赛中，领跑的依然是美国。

　　《纽约时报》报道，2010年9月，美国和以色列合作，用“震网”病毒侵入伊朗布什尔核电站计算机系统，严重影响核反应堆的建设进度。有消息称，美军已经研制出两千多种网络病毒武器，“弹药”包括蠕虫、特洛伊木马等电脑病毒。

　　其他国家也积极备战。日本防卫厅组建了一支五千余人的网络战部队，专事网络攻防，并研制出多种“网络战武器”。英国也在进行网络武器开发，并将其列为国家最高机密。俄罗斯、以色列、韩国、印度、朝鲜等国和台湾地区，都已成立网军。

Battlefield without gunpowder

　　The virtual space of the war, similar to the scene in "Pirates of the dream space": the enemy access to the traffic signal control system of a country, the road north and south, east to west at the same time give the green light, the the comic big crash occurred, traffic gridlock; blackout the city without water stop gas, infrastructure paralyzed, residents living in dire straits. "If Guangzhou parked on the two days of water, that is definitely not one way or another as simple as a car mineral water relief. Blackout make one or two thousand people called not being heard by anyone." An unnamed senior PLA The generals told the Southern Weekend reporter said, countries have begun to build their own network deterrence "system based on the concept of" nuclear deterrence ".

　　The war in cyberspace, the subversion of the traditional war philosophy, blurring the distinction between war and peacetime. "In the past your warships into the territorial waters of fire, fire you combat aircraft flew into my airspace, I think I declared war. Every day playing networked war, who are soldiers? Hit what scale be regarded as a declaration of war? "Secretary Guangya, professor at the National Defense University, believes that this is the invisible new frontier of the country, the war of the future will expand around it, who has mastered the system and network rights, grasps the initiative in the war.

　　In the race, the lead is still the United States .

　　"The New York Times reported, in September 2010, the United States and Israel , "Earthquake Network" virus penetrated the computer systems of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, seriously affect the progress of the construction of nuclear reactors. The news that the U.S. military has developed a of of 2,000 multiple network virus weapons, "ammunition" for computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses and other.

　　The other countries are also actively preparing for war. Japan Defense Agency set up a five thousand network warfare units, specializing in network attack and defense, and developed a variety of network warfare weapons. The British also network weapons development, and listed as a national top secret. Russia , Israel , South Korea , India , North Korea and other countries and Taiwan , have set up a Cyber Army.

解放军已经建成第一个网络战基地，这是其在信息化战争时代加强军队数字安全努力的一部分。图为解放军官兵在网络大课堂里学习。

中国“网络蓝军”真实情况如何？

　　“加强网络安全，研究网络对抗规律，演练时就要设红、蓝方阵营，在对抗中找出薄弱点。”叶征说，美国可以大张旗鼓组织6万多人的网络作战力量，中国进行一些必要的网络防护准备，也在情理之中。中国的网络安全防护力量，仍归属于总部和各军种传统的信息对抗部门，还没有成军。

　　中山大学网络与信息技术中心李磊博士则称，可以把“网络蓝军”看成应对网络入侵的“消防队”，类似反恐队员。

　　“在网军、网络安全建设方面，中国远远落后于西方大国。”司光亚把中国军队信息化建设时期分为三阶段：1980年代，从空军防空系统起步；1990年代，各军种分散建设，各自发展；新世纪以来，提倡联合作战，互联互通。网络安全建设与之同步进行。

　　建网军是各国大势所趋，但外界对“中国网军”特别关注，带有意识形态因素，与中国制造航母、隐形飞机成为焦点如出一辙。“这几年中国发展很快，美国觉得对它真正构成了威胁，始终盯着中国，鼓噪中国威胁论，其他西方国家跟着美国走。”司光亚认为，抱有同样心理的韩国宣称朝鲜有3万网军，是夸大其辞——朝鲜国力不允许；网络战也不是靠人海战术取胜。

. Pictured PLA officers and men in the network classroom learning.

Chinese "how to network the Blues" real situation?

The People's Liberation Army has completed the first network warfare base, which is part of its efforts to strengthen the army in the era of information warfare digital security

　　Strengthen network security research network confrontation law, the drills should set red, blue side camp to find out the weak points in the confrontation. "The lobulation said, the United States can be a big way to the organization's network of more than 60,000 combat forces, China carried out a number of The network protection necessary preparations reasonable. China's network security forces, and is attributed to the headquarters and each branch of the military the information confrontation departments, yet successful Army.

　　Dr. Li Lei, Sun Yat-sen University Network and Information Technology Center claimed that the network the Blues "can be seen as a" fire brigade "to deal with network intrusion, similar to the anti-terrorist team.

　　"Cyber Army, network security building, China lags far behind the Western powers. "Secretary Guangya, Chinese military information construction period is divided into three stages: in the 1980s, started from the Air Force air defense systems; 1990s, each branch of the military decentralized construction each development; since the beginning of the new century, the promotion of joint operations and interoperability. In parallel with the construction of network security.

　　The network construction Army is countries the general trend, but the outside world, " Cyber Army "of particular concern with ideological factors, with Chinese-made aircraft carrier, stealth aircraft to become the focal point is exactly the same. China has developed rapidly in these years, the United States feel that it really constitutes a threat, always focused on China, the clamor for the China threat theory, other Western countries followed the United States to go. "Secretary Guangya that have the same psychological Korea claimed North Korea 30000 Cyber Army is exaggerated - the Korean national strength is not allowed; network warfare is not a mere human wave tactics to win.

　　资料图：美国空军网络战司令部内部工作场景

　　谁在威胁谁？

　　中国黑客被称为“全球最大的网络攻击力量”，也常被当成“中国网军”，但多位中国专家表示，这是一种误解，中国黑客不可能“奉献”全球最大的威胁。

　　中国最早开始研究黑客的专家许榕生判断，中国对外攻击的黑客，多是学生，没有真正的高手。“谷歌受到黑客攻击也很恼火，把火烧到中国，但苦于找不到相应的证据。你说我攻击你，证据在哪里？这些证据是不是站得住脚？”许榕生近年来与美国互联网专家进行交流，美国专家心里很清楚，中国的黑客，经历了从早期的红客，到黑色产业链牟利者的演变：早期黑他国政府网站，后来是在利用黑客工具赚钱。

　　“中国的网很大，资源很多，谁都想在这里看一眼，偷一点东西。中国的互联网被很多境外的黑客组织、机构当成一个实验场，在这里面干他们想干的事情。”解放军信息技术安全研究中心总工李京春认为，很多攻击是将中国作为跳板。

　　“全中国的顶级黑客不超过三位数，此外都是庞大的‘群众力量’——中国黑客门槛低，大多是一些小打小闹的‘毛贼’，在网上下载有中文界面的黑客软件，扫描一个国外网段，就被认为是攻击，但真正有效的攻击并不多。”李磊对南方周末记者说。

　　在国家信息中心专家委员会主任宁家骏看来，目前国内对小黑客打击不足，让其对外频繁出招，显得中国很不大气，也违反国际规则。

　　中国早已成为黑客攻击的最大受害国。2000年，中国的电网就受到外界干扰，部分电厂无法正常工作；郑州的铁路货运系统同样受干扰，所有车辆调度被影响。但中国没有对外宣扬。“强势国家，说出来是一种威慑；弱势国家，说了也没人听、没人信，而且暴露了薄弱点，更加危险。”司光亚说。

　　“2009年，中国境内被木马程序控制的主机IP数超26万个，境外16万多个主机地址参与控制这些计算机；被僵尸程序控制的主机IP数超83万个，境外近2万个主机地址参与控制这些计算机；该年实施网页篡改攻击的前20位黑客中，过半来自境外。”国家互联网应急中心运行部副主任周勇林在接受媒体访问时曾称。

美报称中国成网络战大国

　　“美国的杀手锏”

　　宁家骏认为，中国的信息安全问题内在的根本原因，在很大程度上是过度依赖国外产品造成的。

　　全世界13台管理互联网主目录的根域名服务器，分布于美国、英国、瑞士、日本，其中美国有10台，中国一台都没有。中国普遍使用英特尔CPU，“国产龙芯CPU比它差三代，相当于CRT和LED电视机的差距。”李磊担忧的是，中国的数据库、安全标准、公开的通讯协议规范，几乎都来自国外。微软占据中国操作系统98%的市场份额。在重要基础设施方面，中国商业银行目前的软硬件系统国产化率不到3%，电梯、地铁程序都用国外系统。如果被设置“后门”，安全无从谈起。

　　曾有一个说法：1991年海湾战争前，美国特工在伊拉克于法国购买的打印机中嵌入病毒芯片，战时导致伊防空体系中的预警系统瘫痪，美机长驱直入。“这件事尽管现在被证伪，但给中国大大敲响了警钟。你所有芯片都是别人生产的，就是知道问题的严重性，也没有办法去改变，这就是差距。技术落后、产品落后，最后出台什么政策，都扭转不了。”司光亚说。

　　意识到这个问题后，对银行、海关、铁路等国家重要基础设施，中国在2005年开始试点进行风险评估，并将其与等级保护工作结合。李京春总结，这几年来，电力、银行、保险、证券、铁路、电信等大型国有企业，以及税务、海关，已经能抵御一般网络攻击，不过仍然难以抵御大规模、有组织的国家攻击。震网病毒事件发生后，该领域的安全问题再度凸显。“美国真正的杀手锏在这里。它现在还没有动手，但是必须高度警惕。一旦动手，损失是巨大的。”宁家骏对此表示担心。

　　技术过度依赖的背后，是中国人才培养机制的相对欠缺。网络技术军民通用，军队培养网络人才，以地方大学为主，军事院校为辅。但与国外专设网络安全专业、有一整套教材相比，中国多挂靠计算机专业，未成系统。还有很多人自学成才，国家、国防安全意识欠缺，容易泄密。

　　互联网是技术密集型领域，还需要数学、物理、电子等基础学科支撑。中国在这方面与国外的差距，非朝夕所能弥补。李磊说，二战期间，苏联是大机械化农业，拖拉机手被训练成坦克手。美国、德国有很多民间小型飞机培训学校，从中选拔航空人才。日本没有苏联的优势，又因国力有限，没有民间航空俱乐部。于是，日本由国家重金“砸”出一批飞行员。但他们在战争中逐渐损失后，日本无法正常战斗，只能组织敢死队，难逃战败命运。在互联网领域，中国今天面临类似情况。

　　战争真正发生时，胜负是由一国国力等综合水平决定，并非靠一招鲜就能打遍天下。“攻防此消彼长，这个斗争没有止境。但是我们处于一种被动的地位——核心设备、操作系统大部分是人家的，现在人家又来抢你的应用，哪有安全啊？”李京春总结。

　　图为英国参与的“数码风暴三”网络攻击演习。

　　突围“一亩三分地”

　　经历黑客攻击等事件后，中国已经密切关注国际网络安全态势。缺乏核心自主性，网络信息安全的战略研究、综合协调不足，依然是绕不开的瓶颈。

　　“其实美国也是被2001年‘9·11’事件触发。”在李磊看来，美国此前也缺乏清晰的网络战略，FBI、国家安全局等部门监管各有一套。但在“9·11”的惨痛教训后，美国发现，很多事件其实早有征兆，只是各自搜集的零星信息未被整合，没能及时制止悲剧发生。尽管面临重重阻力，美各部门还是整合了起来。刚公布的《网络空间国际战略报告》就体现出很强的整合和协调性。

　　在战略研究方面，美国国家网络安全战略经历了一个很长的制定期，从小布什在任时即启动，到奥巴马时代又汇聚大量人力物力进行，实施了“新曼哈顿计划”，制定了总体战略。

　　我国信息安全管理各部门还是守着自己的一亩三分地。国内从事信息安全相关研究的机构，缺乏长期、持续、系统的战略研究，往往是事件驱动型，一旦发生某些事件，临时应对，头痛医头、脚痛医脚；国家有关部门如科技部、工信部、发改委，也会往下布置相关研究课题，但研究的全面性、系统性不足。

　　而管理国家信息安全的机构，包括公安部门、国家保密部门、机要部门、工业和信息化部、国务院新闻办、国家互联网信息办公室等，在它们之上，缺乏统一的跨部门协调机构。中国军方也存在多部门各领风骚的问题。

　　“根本还是要坚持持续研究，确定国家战略，发展自主可控成果和能力。但所有环节都自主可控，在相当长的时期内不是非常现实。”宁家骏指出，目前最重要的，是国家充分发挥体制优势，成立跨部门的高层机构，统一战略，加强规划和综合协调。

　　李京春提醒，新时期中国还要更注重“五防”——防网络攻击，防技术窃密，防网络犯罪，防意识渗透，防网络战争。

　　当然，中国也有自己的优势。“中国信息安全保障的能力跟美国虽然不能比，但也有自身特色，在世界上排前列。”李磊说。在叶征眼里，中国的独特优势还在于：网络战是精英战，中国网民基数大，近年来网络和网络知识在国内普及很快，国民和军人素质大幅提高，从几亿人中选拔网络精英，具有先天有利的条件。

　　此外，战争是门博弈的艺术，网络对抗更强调创造性。用别人的武器打自己的仗，历来是中国军队的强项。“网络原创性是你的，你占有天时地利，可以控网络，设后门，植木马，造‘蜂群’，我们处于不利，但我们尽量扬长避短，杀木马、堵后门、防‘蜂群’，创造一些行之有效的杀手锏。在整体不如别人的情况下，还是可以打胜仗。”叶征说。

　　叶征预测，网络发展的大趋势是“全球一张网”，各个封闭、割裂的网络，将不断融入基于IP的国际互联网，形成一个网络的完整世界，云计算、物联网会加速这一过程。中国不能自外于潮流。“中国军队目前基本以物理隔绝为主，但慢慢的，全世界都得融到一张网里去。那时你的信息安全不是靠物理隔绝，而是靠更高的技术手段来维护。”

　　而美国制定网络空间国际战略，推行所谓“网络自由”，主张不受隔离的互联网，反对网络主权，“这些都和我们国家的很多东西是截然相反的，字里行间对我们有很大的威胁。”宁家骏说，“客观来说，对待网络安全、网络反恐，我们和美国有着共同的使命，对网络攻击可以说是‘麻秆打狼，两头害怕’。所以我们现在提出——发挥联合国在国际互联网管理中的作用，建立一个在联合国框架下的、公正的互联网国际管理机构。”

　　宁家骏建议中国积极争取国际话语权，开展网络外交、国际合作，参与互联网安全国际规则的讨论和制定，禁止使用大规模网络杀伤武器。

Figure: scene of the inner workings of the U.S. Air Force Network Warfare Command

　　Who is threatening whom?

　　Chinese hackers are known as "the world's largest network attacking force, often as a" Chinese Cyber Army ", but a number of Chinese experts said that this is a misunderstanding, Chinese hackers impossible" dedication, "the world's biggest threat.

　　The Chinese hackers first began to study expert Xu Rongsheng judgment, China's foreign attacks, hackers, and more students, there is no real master. "Google by hackers attack also was annoyed, to set fire to the Chinese, but could not find evidence you say I attack you, where is the evidence? Evidence is not tenable?" Xu Rongsheng Internet experts in recent years with the United States In exchange the hearts of American experts is very clear, Chinese hackers, experienced Honker from the early to the black industry chain profiteers evolution: early black Government website, then using hacking tools to make money.

　　" Many of China 's network, resources, and no one would like to look at the here and steal a little something Chinese Internet hackers outside organizations, institutions as an experimental field dry the things they wanted to do this. "People's Liberation Army IT Security Research Center, Chief Engineer Li Jingchun many attacks as a springboard.

　　" China 's top hackers no more than three digits, in addition are huge 'strength of the masses' - Chinese hackers threshold is low, mostly some minor 'furry thieves' online hacker software download Chinese interface scan a foreign network segment, that is an attack, but the attacks are not really effective. "Lei told the Southern Weekend reporter said.

　　Ning Jiajun, Director of the State Information Center, the Committee of Experts little hack to combat let foreign frequent moves, it is very atmospheric, but also in violation of international rules.

　　China has become the biggest victim of hacking attacks. In 2000, China's power grid by outside interference, some power plants can not work properly; Zhengzhou railway freight system is also subject to interference, all vehicle scheduling impact. However, China has no external publicity. "Strong countries, say it is a deterrent; vulnerable countries, saying that no one listens to, no one would believe, but also exposed the weak points, the more dangerous." Secretary Guangya said.

　　In 2009, the number of host IP in China Trojans control over 260,000, more than 160,000 foreign host addresses involved in the control of these computers; the bot control host IP over 830,000, nearly 20,000 foreign host address involved in the control of these computers; implementation of the year top 20 hackers web tampering attacks, more than half from overseas. "national the Internet emergency center run Ministry Deputy Director Zhou Yonglin, he said in an interview.

The United States reported that the major powers of China into network warfare

　　" killer "

　　China's information security problems inherent fundamental reason, largely over-reliance on foreign products caused Ning Jiajun.

　　13 units worldwide Internet home directory root domain name server, distributed in the United States , the United Kingdom , Switzerland , Japan , of which 10 units in the United States, the Chinese are not a. China generally use Intel CPU domestic Godson CPU worse than three generations, is equivalent to the gap between the CRT and LED TV. "Lei concern is that the Chinese database, safety standards, open communication protocol specification, almost all from abroad. Microsoft occupy 98% market share in the operating system of China. In critical infrastructure, software and hardware systems localization rate of the Chinese commercial banks are currently less than 3%, elevator, subway procedures with foreign systems. If it is set to the "back door" security out of the question.

　　There was a saying: before the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. agents embedded in Iraq printer was purchased in France virus chip wartime cause paralysis of the early warning system in the Iraqi air defense system, the U.S. plane to drive straight. "This thing is now falsifiable, but a wake-up call to the Chinese all your chips are produced by someone else, is to know the seriousness of the problem, there is no way to change this is the gap backward technology products backward Finally, the introduction of what policy can not reverse. "Secretary Guangya said.

　　Aware of the problem of the country's major banks, customs, railway infrastructure, in 2005, China started a pilot risk assessment, and in conjunction with the rank of protection. The Lijing Chun summarize, the past few years, power, banking, insurance, securities, railways, telecommunications and other large state-owned enterprises, as well as taxation, customs, and have been able to resist the general network attacks, large-scale, organized national attack but still hard to resist. The seismic network virus incident, the security issues in the field once again highlighted. The real killer here. Still no hands, but must be highly vigilant Once hands, the loss is huge. "Ning Jiajun expressed worry.

　　Behind the over-reliance on technology, the relative lack of personnel training mechanism. Network technology, military and civilian, army training network talent, local universities, supplemented by military academies. But dedicated network security and foreign professional set of teaching materials compared to China and more linked with computer professional, minor system. There are a lot of people self-taught, the lack of countries, national defense, security awareness, easy to leak.

　　The Internet is a technology-intensive fields, but also need the basic disciplines of mathematics, physics, electronics and other support. Gap with foreign countries in this regard, non-overnight can make up. Lei said that during World War II, the Soviet Union is the big mechanized agriculture, tractor driver training into tanks hand. The United States, there are a lot of small civil aircraft training schools in Germany , from the selection of aviation personnel. Japan without the advantage of the Soviet Union, because of the limited national strength, not a civil aviation club. Thus, a large amount of money by the state "hit" of a group of pilots. Their gradual loss in the war, the Japanese can not normally fight, the only organization of death squads, could not escape the defeat fate. In the Internet field, face a similar situation today.

　　The war really happened, the outcome is determined by the level of a country's national strength and other not rely on a fresh recruit will be able to hot topic. "Offensive and defensive counter-balance, this struggle is never-ending, but we are in a passive position - core equipment, operating systems, most of the people, but now people rob your application, how can there be security?" Lijing Chun summarize .

Pictured British participation in the "Digital Storm III" cyber attack exercises.

Breakout "one-third of an acre of land

　　Experienced hacker attacks and other events, China has to pay close attention to the international network security posture. The lack of the core autonomy, network and information security strategic research, lack of comprehensive coordination is still not open around the bottleneck.

　　"In fact, the United States is the 2001 September 11 event trigger." Seems to Li Lei, the United States had also the lack of a clear strategy for the network with a separate supervision of the FBI, the National Security Agency and other departments. But after the painful lessons of the "9.11", the United States found a lot of events has already been signs, just the respective sporadic collected information is not integrated, and could not in time to stop the tragedy. Despite facing many obstacles, the United States department or integration. International Strategy Report "just released" cyberspace reflects the strong integration and coordination.

　　Strategic research, the U.S. National Cyber Security Strategy experienced a long period of formulation from Bush that start at any time, to the Obama era has brought together a lot of human and material resources, the implementation of the "new Manhattan Project to develop the overall strategy .

　　China's information security management departments or guarding their own one-third of an acre of land. Domestic institutions engaged in research in information security, the lack of long-term, sustained, strategic research, tend to be event-driven, event of certain events, temporary response, piecemeal gap the disease; relevant state departments such as the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry, Development and Reform Commission, also down arrangement of relevant research topic, but the comprehensiveness of the study, the lack of systemic.

　　Management of national security agencies, including the public security department, the national security department, the confidential sector, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the State Council Information Office, the State Internet Information office, above them, the lack of a unified inter-departmental coordination mechanism. The Chinese military also exists the problem of multi-sector leading the trend.

　　"Fundamental or to insist on continuing research to determine the national strategy, the development of independent and controllable results and ability, but all the links are independent and controllable, in a fairly long period of time is not very realistic." Ning Jiajun pointed out, the most important countries give full play to the institutional advantages, to set up a high-level inter-departmental agencies, unified strategy to strengthen planning and coordination.

　　Li Jingchun remind new era China, but also pay more attention to the "Five Anti" - anti-cyber attacks, theft of the anti-technology, anti-cyber-crime, anti-consciousness penetration, anti-cyber warfare.

　　Of course, China has its own advantages. "The ability of information security with the United States can not be compared, but also has its own characteristics, the forefront of the row in the world." Lei said. In the eyes of Ye Zheng, China's unique advantage lies in: network war is the elite war, large base of Internet users in China, the recent years, the popularity of the network and the networks of knowledge in the country soon, nationals and military personnel a substantial increase in the quality of network selection from hundreds of millions of people Elite has innate favorable conditions.

　　In addition, the war is the art of the game in the door, more emphasis on creative network confrontation. Its own battles with other people's weapons, the Chinese army's strengths has always been. Network originality you you occupy the right place at the right time, you can control the network, located backdoor planting Trojans made 'bees', we are at a disadvantage, but we try to avoid weaknesses, kill the Trojan blocking the back door, anti-'bees' create effective killer. overall as well as others in the case, can still win the war. "Ye Zheng said.

　　The lobulation forecast trend of network development is a global network, all closed, fragmented network, will continue into the IP-based Internet, to form a complete network world, cloud computing, Internet of things will accelerate the process. China can not remain outside the trend. "Chinese army is cut off from basic physics-based, but slowly the whole world had to melt into a network go when your information security does not depend on physical isolation, but by a higher technical means to maintain. '

　　International strategic development of cyberspace in the United States, the implementation of the so-called "network freedom" advocates are not isolated from the Internet against Internet sovereignty, "and our country a lot of things these are diametrically opposite, between the lines we have a lot of threats." Ning Jiajun said, "Objectively speaking, the treatment of network security, cyber-terrorism and the United States, we have a common mission, network attacks can say is 'hemp fight wolves, two afraid' so we now put forward - play the United Nations in Internet management, set up under the framework of the United Nations, just Internet international regulatory agencies. "

　　Ning Jiajun recommended to actively seek the right to speak out their networks in diplomacy, international cooperation, and to participate in the discussion and formulation of the rules of the international Internet security, prohibit the use of large-scale networks destruction weapons.

Source: http://mil.chinaiiss.com/html/20183/1/a5bc14_9.html

Chinese Military View on US Army Use of Information Warfare

美军官分析信息战理论缺陷 提出实战中十条法则

作者：知远

2010年11月01日17:24

　　信息战包涵的概念很多，除了人们比较熟悉的计算机网络战、电子战之外，信息战还包括心理战、情报和舆论战等，本文主要讨论的就是信息战中的情报和舆论战。我是一名在阿富汗库纳尔省省会阿萨达巴德执行任务的美军连长，在阿富汗进行信息战的过程中，我们通常会与省级重建队、省长、警察局长和阿富汗当地媒体进行广泛的合作。

　　我所在的营受命于陆军中校威廉•奥斯特伦德，所负责的区域是阿富汗最暴力最混乱的地区之一，包括瓦纳特、卡林哥谷、佩赫谷以及与巴基斯坦交接的巴加尔地区。执行了一段时间任务之后，我们逐渐明白，在该地区，我们也许可以保证在每次与叛乱分子的直接交火中都获得胜利，但是我们却没有能力在信息战中也做到这样。在进入该地区的第二个月，我们的某连对瓦塔普谷进行了一次空袭，之后与敌人进行了激烈的交火，击毙了几十名叛乱分子，我们也牺牲了两名伞兵。经过一天的战斗，我们获得了最终的胜利，但是很快我们就发现，在信息战的战场上我们失败了。在交战的过程中，叛乱分子仅仅通过一部简单的卫星电话就与当地媒体取得了联系，他们告诉媒体我们正在随意地屠杀平民。因此我们尽管取得了战斗的胜利，却被被倒打一耙，最后我们不得不立即向上级和当地民众解释媒体报道的不实。

　　从那次失败之后，我们下决心要保证在以后的战斗中再也不能由于缺乏主动的信息战行动而导致行动无法取得完全的成功。到了第二年，信息战已经成为了我们的战场战术中必不可少的一部分。在战斗结束后，我们会从整个镇压叛乱战役的角度来评估每次战斗或事件，这样可以保证我们的镇压叛乱行动更加清晰和有效。我们发现，对信息战的成败起决定性作用的是阿富汗的普通民众。

　　经过对我们部署的反思，我现在认为我们当初在信息战当中经常处于劣势与美军的高级信息战理论和结构问题有关，因此我相信这个问题在美国陆军中普遍存在，我们提出的解决方案可以广泛适用于前线部队。当前我们各级部队都在努力解决空袭中造成平民伤亡的问题，这个问题最大的困难其实就是我们在镇压叛乱的行动中利用信息战能力的不足。本文可以说就是对该问题的一种反思。

　　要想更好地理解镇压叛乱的任务特点，有效地执行相关任务，我们的战场指挥官必须要想办法克服美国陆军在信息战系统中存在的理论缺陷和头重脚轻的结构问题。在进行信息战时，作战指挥官必须让他的部下——具体到每一个营、连、排和班——理解他的战术意图，合理分配决策权和资源，大胆果断地对敌人展开持久、精确的信息战，而这些行动的受众，就是所有普通的平民。更高级的战术指挥官也必须意识到在行动前先制定好信息战的策略会对作战任务的成败起到决定性的作用。成功的镇压叛乱需要我们通过主动的宣传，改变当地的风气，让普通民众了解我们的原则和作战方式。事实上，这些原则和作战方式经过提炼，就可以变成有效、实用的信息战理论。

　　信息战理论的缺陷

　　目前美军没有专门为营级和营级以下编制制定的信息战理论。在镇压叛乱的战争中，战略单位和战术单位都需要从上级获取并向下级分配与信息战有关的作战资源，但是每个单位往往对信息战有着各自不同的定义和理解，这种理论层面的矛盾容易导致负责火力作战的单位和负责信息战的单位不能形成良好的配合，造成那些原本可以占据优势的信息战资源的浪费，导致作战过程中参战单位默契不足，并影响军官作出最有效的指挥决定。

　　执行镇压叛乱任务的战术单位往往对信息战这个词都有一个自我理解，最简单的处理办法就是把信息战当成公共事务或者公共关系来对待。在目前的战场上，保证我们控制战场信息情况的任务主要是由当地的安全部队来承担，这种做法过于简单，使得当前的信息战远没有达到联合作战理论和陆军理论中所定义的战场效果。在《野战手册3-24》“镇压叛乱”这一部分中，对联合作战和陆军作战情况下的信息战是这样定义的：

　　联合作战：集中核心力量，综合电子战、计算机网络战、心理战、军事欺骗和作战安全等手段，与专门的支持和相关单位配合，来影响、干扰、破坏和夺取敌人的人工或自动决策权，同时保护己方的相关能力。（摘自《联合出版物1-02》）

　　陆军作战：集中核心力量，综合电子战、计算机网络战、心理战、军事欺骗和作战安全等手段，与专门的支持和相关单位配合，来干扰敌人的信息系统并影响其决策能力，同时保护己方的信息系统。（摘自《野战手册3-13》

　　这两种对信息战不尽相同的理解正好显示了目前美军中信息战理论的缺陷所在。陆军的信息战系统是根据自身对信息战的定义而建立的，而在实际的镇压叛乱战斗中，为了保证决策的正确性，联合战术部队在信息战范畴内的行动一般都是以具体事件为出发点来考虑的。因此，陆军的信息战系统往往无法收到预期的效果。可以直言不讳地说，正是由于没有考虑到镇压叛乱战斗的实际特点，所以才导致了陆军在信息战中屡屡受挫。

　　对信息战的有效定义必须综合考虑公共事务、公共关系、交战国的军事和媒体状况等因素。公共事务和公共关系包括通过非传统媒体和社会组织来向民众散播和传递消息。甚至包括最简单的信息战方式：直接面对面地告诉对方信息。

　　《陆军野战手册3-13》的“信息战：理论、战术、技术和规程”这一部分里有如下叙述：这部分手册的主要适用对象是陆军战斗和后勤部队、团、师、旅级战斗队和参谋官——尤其是负责情报、计划和联合行动的参谋，以及直接参与军事欺骗、电子战、作战安全、火力支援、心理战、民政和公共事务的人员。因此这部分内容对团级和师级行动非常适用。而营级部队则通常需要只能执行上级指挥部的信息战策略。在维稳行动和支援行动中，营级部队可能会掌握一些有利于信息战的条件，但是他们首先需要知道自己在旅级和师级部队的信息战策略里所扮演的角色。

　　除上述材料之外，在战术层面上，美军便没有附加的野战手册或其他理论来将营级和营级以下的部队有效地整合到信息战系统中。

　　《陆军野战手册3-24》提到“信息战经常会是作战中决定性的逻辑步骤”。事实上，即使不是那么“决定性”，信息战也可以为战斗胜利起到非常重要的作用。《陆军野战手册3-24》和美军七年来的作战经验让我们明白到，在镇压叛乱的战斗中，战乱国民众的支持与否至关重要。在实际作战中，无论我们在战斗中获胜或是失败，总会有士兵因非战斗因素而受伤或送命。目前的情况是，在战斗中信息战的影响非常关键，战乱国民众的态度已经被看作是重要的战略资源，而无论是我们的联合作战还是陆军作战理论，在信息战领域都无法为直接参加战斗的连长、排长、班长火力小组提供有效的支持。

　　信息战系统的结构问题

　　美军现有的信息战系统在师级和旅级层面汇集了专家、资源和决策人，但是在实际的镇压叛乱战争中，军队最需要的是在连级和排级部队能拥有稳定的信息战能力。

　　信息战是镇压叛乱行动成功的关键。从战术层面来讲，要想有效地执行镇压叛乱任务，就需要在营级和营级以下的层面和战乱国的民众建立牢固的信任和默契。偏偏在最重要的营级和营级以下部队中，没有专门的信息战行动理论指导。而在资源、人员、装备和训练方面的头重脚轻进一步降低了营、连、排、班和火力小组的信息战能力。军方对将信息战的发起者和决策权限定在师级和旅级层面是因为他们觉得只有至少达到这个级别的部队才有资格发起或决定信息战。虽然师级和旅级部队在理论上也可以充当战术部队，但是在当前镇压叛乱的战争环境下，我们必须尽量在平民面前保持最小的战术暴露。结果现在的情况就是信息战的指挥和传送系统处在战略层面，而这个系统最应该关注的目标却处于战术层面。

　　这种头重脚轻的系统结构在一定程度上要归因于信息战本身的特点，我们确实不可能将电子战或网络战的任务简单地分配给参加近战的每一个步兵。但是对公共事务、军事欺骗和心理战等形式的信息战而言，只有战术甚至战场级别的行动才能收到最好的效果。在战场上，信息战的战场控制非常关键，增强当地民众对我们的行动和本国政府的信心有时候比部队的调遣更有用。民众的理解和配合是镇压叛乱战争中信息战的获胜法宝，在这种分散和分布式的战场环境中，要想获得局部的胜利，完全没有必要暴露师级和旅级部队的存在。美国陆军现在正在调整信息战系统，以让其适应当前的战争形势，其中最关键的一点就是：从战术层面上让战乱国的平民尽可能地了解我们的行动.

　　对指导实战的信息理论的建议

　　在阿富汗的库尔纳省和努里斯坦省执行镇压叛乱任务的美军特种部队根据他们从2007年5月到2008年8月的战斗经验，总结出了十条信息战法则。目前存在的理论缺陷使得美军很难在主动、全面的信息战中占得便宜。这十条法则综合考虑了军队、民事部门和当地政府等因素，可以在一定程度上帮助作战部队克服信息战指导理论上的缺陷。

　　1、在镇压叛乱的战争中，取得平民的信任是非常重要的。事实的真相往往“对我们有利，而不是负担”。

　　在美军士兵中普遍存在一种错误的看法，那就是叛乱分子之所以难以对付，是因为他们可以根据情况散播一些对自身有利的虚假消息，而并不用承担因此带来的负面影响。事实上，欺诈战术要想在信息战中发挥效用，必须有一个前提就是事情的真相还不为人知，没人能识破这些欺诈。因此，从长远和高效的角度来考虑的话，我们需要在镇压叛乱行动中的信息战里保持坦诚，既要向平民发布真实的信息，也要公开地处理与叛乱分子有关的信息。美军部队必须利用一切机会公开揭露叛乱分子散播的欺诈消息。同时，我们也应该主动承认行动中的差错，并承担相关的责任。否则的话，叛乱分子就会乐得利用这些机会来破坏我们的名誉、降低当地平民对美军的信任。诚实、负责、高效的态度是获得平民信任的不二法门，这方面做好了，我们才能在战场上获得胜利。

　　2、通过传播信息达到实际的目的

　　在镇压叛乱战争中没有完全孤立的事件。任何事件都是在更大的叛乱环境下发生的，因此，要想让战乱国的平民了解事实真相，有效的信息战行动是必不可少的。有效的信息战可以起到解释的作用，向平民解释美军的每次行动的目的和意义，最终让他们相信，比起叛军，新政府会是更好的选择。为了达到这个目的，我们必须清楚平民所关心的敏感问题，并主动把对这些问题的解释与实时的战况一起通报给他们。通过这样来拉近与平民的关系，要让平民在想到叛军时会自然意识到是“他们”，而想到美军时是“我们”。这种貌似微不足道的文字区别会潜移默化地让平民接受美军。比如一次爆炸事件，可以直接地叙述为“造成两名士兵死亡并炸毁了一辆盟军的汽车”，也可以描述为“造成两名士兵死亡，并导致一支公路建设施工队受到伤害，该施工队当时正在修建一条从偏远小镇到商业中心的公路”。我们应该采用后一种宣传方式，详细地陈述事件中的每一个细节——最好是能和战乱国平民的前景联系起来，让平民感觉叛乱分子是站在了他们的对立面。忽视这些细节就是放弃在舆论上给叛乱分子施压的机会。仅仅告诉平民发生了什么还不够，我们还必须让他们知道这些事件会对他们产生何种影响，甚至解释为什么会有这样的后果。

　　3、保证整体的联系，“每次单独的事件在信息战中都有意义”

　　镇压叛乱活动的每一次胜利或受挫，都是双方可以加以进一步利用的机会。高效的信息战必须包括通过主动的手段来保证美军能够最大限度地利用这些事件的积极影响，同时尽量屏蔽对叛乱分子有利的因素。

　　我们当前的信息战行动很多时候只是在被动地消除叛乱分子造成的不良影响。其实主动行动的机会是始终存在的，这需要我们的指挥官学会把每次战斗或每次事件整合到更高一层的范畴上来考虑，进而形成合力，使单次事件的正面影响得到加强和扩展。利用每次事件的积极影响，可以维持美军和平民之间的良性关系，而平民对叛乱分子的信任度就会下降，继而迫使叛乱分子在信息战中转入被动防御状态。总之，我们必须尽力把战场上的挫折转变为宣传上的胜利，而战场上的胜利则要让它成为影响更大的全面胜利。

　　此外，我们在信息宣传过程中应该尽量与当地政府、媒体、权力掮客合作，逐渐让当地平民习惯于接受来自我们的信息。很多时候，战乱国的平民并不仅仅是因为宗教和文化同情才支持叛乱分子，更重要的原因是他们无法了解事情的真相，没有其他可以相信的人。这时如果出现一个可选择的、可持续的信息来源，平民就可以获得更多的知情权，从而分清政府和叛乱分子之间的是非曲直。我们现在就可以扮演这样的角色，相信还有更多的当地媒体会愿意和我们站在一起。平民可以接受到多渠道来源的信息，是建立一个合格政府的必要条件。

　　4、先发制人，“不一定要做得对，只要不错就行了”

　　我们参与镇压叛乱行动的部队必须抢在叛乱分子之前让平民知道交战的消息。我们的信息战传统更强调响应的精确性，而忽视了即时性，这是一个错误的策略。事实上，及时和精确并不一定是相互排斥的，诚实也并不是简单地意味着迟钝。“不错”和“对”不一样，相比于精确度，二者之前的区别与事件的完整度关系更大。可信度并不要求立即的完整度，但它却与即时度和最终的完成度有关。对美军来说，误导、欺骗平民或对其隐瞒信息是没有好处的（出于安全目的的军事欺骗除外），我们没有必要等到事情已经被人说过一遍了再做出反应。美军指挥官必须掌握好时机，我们的信息战行动既不能在信息不足时就仓促展开，也不能为了收集完整的信息而错过最佳时间。对参与直接交火的作战部队来说，把握这种平衡更加重要，因此我建议低级别的军官也应该获准参与到信息战行动的讨论之中，他们对战场形势的判断有时会更为准确。事件发生几分钟后，立刻向平民发布尽可能多的相关信息，有助于拉近我们和平民之间的关系，如果等到两周后事情完全调查清楚之后再做这些，绝对只能是事倍功半。

　　5、找到集中打击敌人的决定性因素，进行以平民为中心的信息战

　　在镇压叛乱战争中，起决定性作用的应该是针对平民的行动。但是美军在实际作战中，往往过于重视与敌人的直接交火，我们仅仅把信息战活动视为防御敌方同类活动的手段。我们的大部分精力都放在如何在战场上消灭敌人上，而没有想到信息战应该以平民为重点对象。事实上，镇压叛乱的行动最关键的就是获得平民的支持，战场上的直接交火固然重要，但是那些行动必须构建在得到平民的信赖的努力之上。

　　6、创建统一的信息战目的

　　尽管美军中的各级指挥部对信息战的理解不尽相同，但是我们要尽量达成一个上下皆通的共识。除了军队，在战场上还活跃着来自省级重建队、国务院职员、政府合作承包商和民事问题专家等人群，他们也是战场空间的组成因素。众多的组织和资金来源通常不利于部队将领进行“清晰的指挥”，而在战乱国的平民看来，所有的这些单位都只不过是“美军的特殊部队”。因此美军的指挥官必须明白在信息战中要将所有单位综合考虑，兼顾统一的效力，每个单位的行为都会影响到美军在平民心中的可信度。

　　要想保证信息战的整体高效性，将信息战的资源和决策权授予给各个战场的中低级军官会是关键的一步。不同地区的情况不尽相同，为了维持美军在平民心中的可信度，一位连长必须有权利掌握和调整其所在地的信息、行动和其他部门职员，甚至联合部队、当地媒体和叛乱分子的动向。从综合的角度与敌人进行信息战有利于我们获得优势。这一点可能与一般人的想象不同，统一的信息战并不一定是高级军官才能做好的事，恰恰相反，我们应该将决策权授予低级别的军官。

　　7、保证24小时*7天的工作效率

　　让美军的每支负责信息战的部队都保持24小时的工作覆盖率是很有必要的。我们在无意中遭受到的失败有很多就是因为目前的12小时工作制并没有在真正意义上解决每天另外50%时间的战斗问题。在当前的战斗环境下，叛乱分子及其附庸媒体在短短的几个小时内就可以“制造”出一则新闻并让它传播开来，而我们的信息战系统则要花好几天才能做到。导致这种慢节奏的主要原因是12小时工作制和决策权的合并。即使是那些有权发出信息战指令的军官，也必须等待相关部门的信息预报、信息同步和物资投送工作完成后才能发出后续命令。我们只有保证指挥资源能够保证24小时的持续覆盖性和能在几分钟时间内做出反应的响应性，才能真正做好战场综合预警，战场指挥官们才能充分利用所获得的信息，我们的信息战系统才不至于显得如此的迟钝和无用。

　　在低空支援、空中近战和伤员撤离等任务中，指令的即时性和有效性尤为关键。在这些情况下，该下达何种命令几乎完全取决于指挥官对形势的判断。我们必须保证参与行动的人员有足够的能力来完成这些任务，因为一旦失败，我们的损失将会非常惨重。而最近的战斗经验证明，我们有必要将这种针对致命打击的紧急行动方式扩展到镇压叛乱战场上的非致命行动中，比如信息战、食物供给以及其他一些救济项目。因为这些行动必须要与平民或叛乱分子进行直接的接触，实质上对参与其中的战术部队来说存在着很大的风险。

　　8、为每次信息战的每个阶段提供充足的资源

　　信息战的每个阶段通常还会包含分支或后续行动。信息战的目的和效果大致上类似于出兵前的预期火力。它可以达到以下目的：

　　•保证平民配合巡逻部队的任务，确保公路施工等工作的正常进行。

　　•向平民展示政府的诚意，这是战场上的交火所不能完成的任务。具体的形式可以是一次媒体发布会。在某次行动期间，美军可以配合当地政府，让政府官员在能够确保安全的隐藏点发表讲话，并通过无线电将讲话的内容传播出去。

　　•加强我们与战乱国的伙伴关系和相关性。比如我们可以通过当地的警察局长提前五分钟发布美军的夜间空袭消息——哪怕这位局长也只是在五分钟之前才得知的。

　　•公布工程完成、项目结束或者一些阶段性成果。我们应该配合当地政府在任何学校修建、道路工程等开工的时候举行相关的社会活动。更具体的说，一次由工程承包商发起的标志着投资完成的午宴；由权力掮客发起的工程开工新闻发布会；一次由媒体全程报道的政府高官的“意外”视察；由省、市政府主办的工程完工庆祝会议；重大事件的周年纪念活动等等，都可以算作是信息战的范畴。

　　总之，在任何发生了非战斗性的人员伤亡或者财产损失的时候，我们都可以见缝插针地展开信息战行动。采取及时、有针对性的信息战行动——哪怕仅仅是只能缓和一下战场行动的负面影响——有助于维持美军在当地平民心中的可信度。一次周全的行动不但需要策划好交火的细节，相关的信息战行动也是必不可少的。

　　9、传授经验，培训当地的信息战力量

　　对镇压叛乱的战争来说，无论我们取得什么样的战果，没有与当地政府建立合作关系那就肯定是失败的。当美军在当地取得信息战领域的优势的时候，我们必须教会当地政府的伙伴也掌握这些作战手段。这些工作需要从现在开始一直持续到美军最终撤离该国并完全将维持国家安全的任务交给新政府为止。责任的转移并不意味着信息战的参与者减少，新政府必须拥有足够的掌握信息战能力的战士，这就像他们需要飞行员、后勤专家和警察一样重要。

　　发展当地的信息战力量也是为了充分利用他们在这方面的优势，当地的信息战参与者比美军更了解他们的语言、文化、历史和实情，由他们发起的信息宣传行动更容易引起民众的共鸣，效率也会更高。

　　10、寻求反馈信息

　　信息战不像直接交火那样将炮弹发射出去之后就不管了。进行信息战就像是与特殊受众进行交流，发出信息仅仅是信息战的开始，搜集受众的反馈信息也是同等重要的。我们可以通过面对面的交流、传统和非传统媒体、热点电话、当地协调中心等途径来了解之前行动的宣传效果。

　　占据信息战的主动地位

　　尽管目前美军的信息战理论和结构存在着这样那样的缺陷，但是我们的各级指挥官必须明白占据信息战的住主动地位是赢得镇压叛乱战争的关键。如果参战部队不能控制信息战的战场，那我们就是放弃了一个有可能起到决定性作用的工具。镇压叛乱的战争关键点在于获得民心，我们就是要通过信息战来为战术部队的行动提供支持。这样做同样还可以帮助当地的新政府扩大影响，最终让民众放弃叛军，拥护新政府。

　　美军的作战和战略指挥部必须积极促进信息战的相关资源在部队上下级之间的分配，让战地军官能够清楚地理解上级的意图，从而更得心应手地展开行动，并且在战争中占据原则上的主动。绝不能因为缺少清晰的目的性和资源使用的优先级，而导致作战部队在技术上占有压倒性优势的情况下却无法在信息战中占到便宜。总之，信息战是一项重要的战术行为，美军的每个营、连、排、班甚至火力小组，都必须主动大胆地参与到其中，掌握信息战的主动权，有助于我们坚持到底，获得最终的胜利。

　　作者：美国陆军上尉莱昂纳多•J•弗洛尔

　　编译：知远/易水寒

U.S. Army officers analyze information warfare theory ~ defects and impacts ten combat rules

Author: Zhiyuan November 01, 2010 17:24

　　Information warfare concepts covered in many, in addition to people are more familiar with computer network warfare, electronic warfare, information warfare, including psychological warfare, intelligence and media warfare, the article focuses on information warfare, intelligence and media warfare. I was a company commander in Afghanistan Kunar provincial capital of Asadabad, the mission of the U.S. military, in Afghanistan, information warfare, usually with the Provincial Reconstruction Team, governors, police chiefs and local Afghan media extensive cooperation.

　　The camp where I was ordered Lieutenant Colonel William Oster Lund, are responsible for the area is one of Afghanistan's most violent most chaotic areas, including Wa Nate, Kalin Ge valley, Pech Valley, and Pakistan handover The Ba Jiaer region. After a period of time the task is executed, we began to understand, perhaps we can guarantee to win every time with the rebels directly crossfire in the region, but we can not afford to do so in information warfare. Into the region of the second month, a Lian Wa Tapu Valley was an air raid, after a fierce exchange of fire with the enemy, killing dozens of insurgents, we sacrifice two paratroopers. After a day of fighting, we get the final victory, but we soon discovered, information warfare on the battlefield, we failed. Warring insurgents only by means of a simple satellite phone with the local media contact, they told the media we are free to massacre civilians. Despite the victory of the battle, he was being falsely accuse Finally, we have to explain to their superiors and the local population immediately untrue media reports.

　　That after the failure, we are determined to ensure that the fighting is no longer due to the lack of proactive information warfare action leads to action not been entirely successful. The second year, information warfare has become an indispensable part of our battlefield tactics. After the battle, from the point of view of the whole to fight the insurgency campaign to assess each battle or event, so you can more clearly and effectively to ensure that our counter-insurgency operations. We found that, play a decisive role in the success or failure of information warfare is the ordinary people of Afghanistan.

　　After on our deployment reflection, I now believe that which we had in the information war often at a disadvantage with the U.S. military's senior information warfare theory and structural problems, so I believe that the problem is widespread in the United States Army, we proposed solutions can be widely applicable to front-line troops. All levels troops are trying to solve the issue of civilian casualties in the air strikes, the greatest difficulty of this problem is actually the lack of information warfare capabilities in counterinsurgency operations. This paper can be said is a reflection of the problem.

　　In order to better understand the characteristics of counterinsurgency tasks to perform related tasks, our battlefield commanders must find a way to overcome the structural problems of the U.S. Army information warfare systems theory defects and top-heavy. During wartime operational commander must let his subordinates - specific to each battalion, company, platoon and classes - understand his tactical intentions, rational allocation of decision-making power and resources, the enemy launched a bold and decisive lasting precise information warfare, and the audience of these actions, all ordinary civilians. More senior tactical commanders must also realize played a decisive role in the success or failure of the action before making a good information warfare strategy will combat missions. The successful counterinsurgency need to us through proactive public to change the local culture, to enable ordinary people to understand the principle and mode of combat. In fact, these principles and combat has been refined, it can become effective, practical information warfare theory.

　　Defects of the theory of information warfare

　　The U.S. military did not specifically for the preparation of the formulation of the theory of information warfare battalion level and below the battalion level. Counterinsurgency warfare, strategic units and tactical units need to be obtained from the superior and subordinate combat related resource allocation and information warfare, but each unit often has a different definition and understanding of information warfare, this theoretical level. easily lead to contradictions responsible for fire-fighting units and the unit responsible for information warfare not a good fit, resulting in a waste of resources, information warfare, could have an advantage, resulting in the course of combat in the war units tacit insufficient, and affect the officers to make the most effective command decision.

　　Perform tactical unit to fight the insurgency mission tend to have a word of information warfare self-understanding, the simplest approach is to put the information to be treated as a public affairs or public relations war. Present on the battlefield, to ensure that the main task of the control of battlefield information is borne by the local security forces, this approach is too simple, the current information warfare is far from reaching the battlefield effect as defined in the theory of joint operations and Army theory . In this part of the "Field Manual 3-24" suppress insurrections "joint operations and information warfare in the case of Army combat is defined as:

　　Joint operations: focus on core strength, integrated electronic warfare, computer network warfare, psychological warfare, military deception and operational security measures, with the dedicated support and related units, to influence, interference, destruction and seizure of manual or automatic decision-making power of the enemy while protecting one's ability. (From "Joint Publication 1-02")

　　Army Combat: focus on core strength, integrated electronic warfare, computer network warfare, psychological warfare, military deception and operational security measures, with the dedicated support and related units, to disrupt the enemy's information systems and affect their decision-making ability, while protecting one's own information systems. (From "Field Manual 3-13

　　These two pairs of different understanding of information warfare shows where the U.S. military in the defects of the theory of information warfare. The Army's information warfare systems according to their own definition of information warfare, in actual counterinsurgency battle, in order to ensure the correctness of the decision-making, the Joint Tactical Force's actions in the context of information warfare are generally specific events The starting point to consider. Therefore, the Army's information warfare systems are often unable to achieve the desired results. Can bluntly said, It is not take into account the actual characteristics of the suppression of the rebellion fighting that led to the Army frustrated in information warfare.

　　Effective definition of information warfare must be integrated into public affairs, public relations, belligerent military and media condition factors. Public affairs and public relations, including through non-traditional media and social organizations to spread to the population, and impart information. Including even the most simple way of information warfare: direct face-to-face to tell each other.

　　Described as follows: mainly applicable object of this part of the manual is the Army combat and logistics units, group, division, brigade combat teams in this part of the "Army Field Manual 3-13" and "information warfare: theory, tactics, techniques and procedures" - especially those responsible for intelligence, planning and joint action of the General Staff, as well as directly involved in military deception, electronic warfare, operations security, fire support, psychological warfare, civil affairs and public affairs officers and staff officers. Therefore, this part of the content on the regimental level and division-level action is very applicable. The battalions usually need only execute the higher headquarters information warfare strategy. Stability operations and support operations battalions may have some beneficial information warfare conditions, but they first need to know the role of information warfare strategy in the brigade and divisional troops.

　　In addition to the above materials, at the tactical level, no additional U.S. military field manual or other theory to the battalion level and below the battalion level forces effectively integrate information warfare systems.

　　Army Field Manual 3-24 "mentioned" information warfare is often the decisive logical step in the battle. " In fact, even if not a "decisive" information warfare can also play for the victory in battle a very important role. Army Field Manual 3-24 "and U.S. forces seven years of combat experience let us understand that, in the counterinsurgency fight, the support of the people of war-torn countries or not essential. In actual combat, whether we win or loss in combat, there will always be soldiers injured or get killed in non-combat factors. The current situation is that the impact of information warfare is critical in combat, the attitude of the people of the war-torn country has been seen as an important strategic resource, regardless of our joint operations Army combat theories in the field of information warfare are not directly The company commander, platoon leader, squad leader, fire team participated in the battle to provide effective support.

　　The structure of the information warfare systems

　　U.S. military information warfare systems at division and brigade levels, bringing together experts, resources and decision-makers, but in the actual counter-insurgency war, the army is the most need is to have a stable of information warfare at the company level and row-level troops capacity.

　　Information warfare is the key to the success of counter-insurgency operations. From the tactical level, in terms of the implementation of the counter-insurgency mission in order to effectively establish a solid trust and understanding, you need to level, and the people of war-torn countries in the battalion level and below the battalion level. Happens in the most important forces battalion level and below the battalion level, there is no theoretical guidance of specialized information warfare action. The top-heavy in the resources, personnel, equipment and training to further reduce the battalion, company, platoon, class and fire team information warfare capabilities. Military information warfare initiators and decision-making authority is given in the divisional and brigade levels, because they feel that at least this level of troops to qualify only initiated or decisions of information warfare. Divisional and brigade-sized forces, in theory, can also act as a tactical forces, but in a counterinsurgency war environment, we must try civilians before the smallest tactical exposure. Result, the situation is information warfare command and transmission system at the strategic level, the goal of this system should be most concerned about at the tactical level.

　　This top-heavy structure of the system is due to some extent on the characteristics of information warfare, we do is not possible to simply electronic warfare, network warfare tasks assigned to each melee infantry. But in terms of public affairs, military deception and psychological warfare, and other forms of information warfare, the only tactical and even battlefield-level action can receive the best results. On the battlefield, the battlefield of information warfare control is critical to enhance local people's confidence in our actions and their governments are sometimes more useful than the troops dispatch. Understood by the people and with the winning magic weapon to suppress the insurgency war in information warfare This decentralized and distributed battlefield environment, in order to obtain a partial victory is absolutely no need to expose the existence of divisional and brigade-sized forces. The U.S. Army now adjust information warfare systems allowed to adapt to the current situation of the war, one of the most critical point is: from the tactical level so that civilians in war-torn countries as much as possible about our actions.

　　Information theory to guide real-proposal

　　U.S. Special Forces to the implementation of the counter-insurgency mission in Khulna Province of Afghanistan's Nuristan province based on their experience from May 2007 to August 2008 battle summarize the rule of 10 information warfare. Theoretical defects existing U.S. military is difficult to be accounted for in a proactive, comprehensive information warfare cheap. The ten rules Considering the army, the civil sector and local governments, and other factors, can help combat troops to some extent overcome the theoretical defect information warfare guidance.

　　1, in the counter-insurgency war, it is very important to obtain the trust of civilians. The truth is often beneficial to us, but not a burden.

　　The widespread U.S. soldiers in a mistaken view, and that is the reason why the insurgents hard to deal with, because they can spread some good false news under the circumstances, and not bear the negative impact. In fact, fraudulent tactics in order to be effective in information warfare must have a premise that truth is also unknown, no one can see through these fraudulent. Therefore, to consider the long-term and efficient, we need to keep in counter-insurgency operations, information warfare frank publish real information, not only to the civilians have to deal openly with the insurgents. U.S. military forces must take advantage of every opportunity to publicly expose the fraudulent messages spread by insurgents. At the same time, we should also take the initiative to recognize the error in action, and related responsibilities. Otherwise, the rebels will be happy to take advantage of these opportunities to damage our reputation, reduce the trust of local civilians by the U.S. military. Honest, responsible and efficient manner is the only way to obtain the trust of civilians, well, we can win on the battlefield.

　　2, through the dissemination of information to the actual purpose of

　　To fight the insurgency war is not completely isolated incident. Any event occurred in the greater insurgency environment, therefore, civilians in war-torn countries to get to know the truth, information warfare action is essential. Effective information warfare can play a role in explain, explain the purpose and significance of every U.S. military action to civilians, and eventually let them believe that, compared to the rebels, the new government would be a better choice. To achieve this goal, we must be aware of the sensitive issues of concern to the civilian population, and take the initiative to explain these problems together with real-time fighting and communicated to them. To closer relations with the civilian population, to make the civilians think the rebels will naturally realize that "they" think the U.S. military is "we". This seemingly insignificant difference between the text will be imperceptible to allow civilians to accept U.S. military. Such as an explosion events, can be directly described as "causing the death of two soldiers and blew up the car of an Allied" can also be described as "causing the death of two soldiers, and led to the construction of a highway construction team hurt The construction team was to build a remote town to the commercial center of the highway. We should adopt the latter form of publicity, a detailed statement of every detail of the event - the best and the prospect of civilians in war-torn countries linked civilians feel insurgents stood their opposites. Ignore these details is to give up the chance of public opinion to put pressure on the insurgents. Just tell civilians what happened was not enough, we also have to let them know what impact these events will even explain why there will be consequences.

　　To ensure overall contact, "each individual event have meaning in the information war."

　　To fight the insurgency activities every victory or frustration are the two sides can be further take advantage of the opportunity. The efficient information warfare including through proactive means to ensure that the U.S. military is able to maximize the positive impact of these events, at the same time try to shield the factors favorable to the insurgents.

　　Our current information warfare actions often only passively to eliminate the adverse effects caused by the insurgents. Positive effects of fact, the initiative the opportunity is always there, our commanders learn to integrate every battle or every event to a higher level areas consider, thus the formation of a joint force, so that a single event has been strengthened and expansion. The positive impact of each event, you can maintain a healthy relationship between the U.S. troops and civilians, civilians, insurgents confidence will drop, and then forced the rebels into a passive defensive information warfare state. In short, we must make every effort to setbacks on the battlefield into a propaganda victory, victory on the battlefield, it will have to become to affect more comprehensive victory.

　　In addition, we are in the information dissemination process should try to cooperate with the local government, the media, the power brokers, and gradually accustomed to receiving information from the local civilians. In many cases, civilians in war-torn countries and not just because of the religious and cultural sympathy of supporting the rebels, the more important reason is that they are unable to understand the truth of the matter, there is no other person can believe that. Then if there is an alternative, sustainable sources of information, civilians can get more right to be informed, so as to distinguish between the government and the rebels on the merits. We now can play such a role, I believe there are more local media and we will be willing to stand together. Civilians can receive multi-channel sources of information, is to create the necessary conditions for a qualified government.

　　4, pre-emptive, "not necessarily doing the right thing, as long as good on the line"

　　Our troops involved in counter-insurgency operations must grab before the rebels to let civilians know warring message. Our information warfare traditional to more emphasis on accuracy of the response, while ignoring the real-time, this is a wrong strategy. In fact, the timely and accurate are not necessarily mutually exclusive, honesty is also not simply mean dull. "Good" and "not the same as compared to the accuracy, the greater the difference before the two events complete relationship. Credibility does not require immediate integrity, but it instant degrees and final completion. The U.S., mislead, deceive civilians or its withholding of information is no good (for security purposes except military deception), we do not need to wait until things have been said over and then react. U.S. commanders have to have a good time, information warfare action neither the lack of information on the rush expand, can not miss the best time to collect complete information. Combat troops involved in the direct exchange of fire, to grasp this balance is more important, so I suggest that low-level officers should be allowed to participate in the discussion of information warfare action, sometimes more accurate in their judgment of the battlefield situation. Incident a few minutes later, and immediately released to the civilian population as much information and help to narrow the relationship between us and the civilians, if you wait until after two weeks to do these things fully investigate the absolute only is less effective.

　　5, to find the focus on the fight against the enemy of the decisive factors centric information warfare civilians

　　Play a decisive role in the suppression of the rebellion war actions against civilians. U.S. troops in actual combat, often too much emphasis on the direct exchange of fire with the enemy, we have only to information warfare activities as a means of defense enemy similar activities. The majority of our energy on how to destroy the enemy on the battlefield, but did not think the information warfare should focus civilians. In fact, the most critical counterinsurgency action is to get the support of the civilian population, directly on the battlefield the crossfire of course important, but those actions must be built on top of efforts to get the trust of the civilians.

　　6, to create a unified information warfare purposes

　　At all levels in the U.S. military headquarters on the understanding of information warfare is different, but we have to try to reach a consensus on a up and down and all directions. In addition to the army on the battlefield is also active in people from the provincial reconstruction team, the staff of the State Council, government cooperation contractor and civil matters experts, they are also the elements of space battlefield. Numerous organizations and funding sources are generally not conducive to the troops generals clear command in the war-torn country's civilians seems all these units only U.S. special forces. U.S. military commanders must understand To all units in the information warfare comprehensive consideration, taking into account the effectiveness of the unified behavior of each unit will affect U.S. credibility in the hearts of civilians.

　　In order to ensure the overall efficiency of information warfare, information warfare resources and decision-making authority granted to the junior officers of various battlefield is a critical step. Vary in different parts of the case, in order to maintain the credibility of the U.S. military in civilian mind, a company commander must have the right to master and adjust the location of the information, actions and other staff of the department, and even joint forces, local media and the rebels trends. Information warfare with the enemy from a comprehensive perspective will help us to gain an advantage. This may be different from the imagination of ordinary people, unified information warfare is not necessarily a high-ranking officers in order to better things, on the contrary, our decision-making powers should be granted to low-level military officers.

　　7, to ensure the efficiency of 24 hours * 7 days

　　Each responsible for information warfare of the U.S. military forces are necessary to maintain a 24-hour work coverage. We inadvertently suffered failure because the current 12-hour work system and not in the true sense of resolve every day another 50% of the time fighting. In the current environment of combat, the rebels and their client media in just a few hours you can "create" a news and let it spread, and information warfare systems to spend several days in order to do it. The main reason for this slow-paced merger of the 12-hour work system and decision-making power. Even those who have the power to issue an information warfare command officers, must wait for the forecast of the relevant departments of information, synchronization of information and material delivery to complete before issuing a subsequent command. We only guarantee to command resources to ensure 24 hours of continuous coverage, responsive and able to respond within a few minutes, in order to really do a good job battlefield comprehensive early warning and battlefield commanders in order to take full advantage of the access to information, the information the warfare systems if they are not seem so dull and useless.

　　Close air support, air melee and casualty evacuation mission, the immediacy and effectiveness of the instruction is particularly critical. In these cases, the issued what order depends almost entirely on the judgment of the commanders on the situation. We must ensure that the personnel involved in the operation have the ability to accomplish these tasks, because once failed, our losses will be very heavy. Recent combat experience proved, we need this for a fatal blow to the urgent action be extended to non-lethal action on the battlefield of the counter-insurgency, such as information warfare, the food supply, as well as some other relief projects. Because these actions must be in direct contact with civilians or insurgents, in essence, there is a considerable risk for tactical forces involved.

　　8, to provide adequate resources for each time information at each stage of the war

　　Each stage of the information warfare usually also contains a branch or follow-up. The purpose and effect of information warfare is largely similar to send troops before the expected firepower. It can achieve the following objectives:

　　• to ensure that the civilian population with the task of patrolling troops to ensure the normal highway construction work.

　　• demonstrate the sincerity of the government to civilians, the task can not be completed in the exchange of fire on the battlefield. Concrete can be in the form of a press conference. During an operation, the U.S. can cooperate with local government, government officials able to ensure the safety of the hidden point in the speech, and spread out the contents of the speech by radio.

　　• Strengthen partnerships and relevance of our war-torn countries. For example, we can advance through the local police chief five minutes the nighttime airstrike news release of U.S. troops - even if this Secretary is also just five minutes before that.

　　• announced the completion of the end of the project, or some of the initial results. We should be in line with the local government in the construction of any school, road works started to hold social activities. More specifically, once initiated by the engineering contractor luncheon marking the investment; project initiated by the power brokers started the press conference; once inspected by senior government officials reported by the media throughout the "accident"; provincial and municipal government the completion celebration sponsored meetings; anniversary of major events, and so on, can be counted as a category of information warfare.

　　In short, any occurrence of a non-combat casualties or property damage, we must attack to expand the information warfare action. Take timely, targeted information warfare action - even if it is just only ease the negative impact of the battlefield action - helps to maintain the credibility of the U.S. military in the minds of the local civilian. The once comprehensive action not only need the planning a good crossfire details, information warfare operations is essential.

　　9, the transfer of experience, training local forces of information warfare

　　Of the counterinsurgency war, no matter what victories we have made, there is certainly no partnership with the local government is a failure. When the U.S. military access to information warfare field advantage in the local, we must teach the local government partners have mastered these means of warfare. These need to be from now lasted until U.S. forces eventually leave the country and fully up to the new Government will be the task of maintaining national security. The transfer of responsibility does not mean reduced information warfare participants, the new government must have enough soldiers to master information warfare capabilities, like they need pilots as important as logistics experts and police.

　　The development of local information warfare forces is to make full use of their advantages in this regard, local information warfare participants more than the U.S. to understand their language, culture, history and truth, information publicity actions initiated by them more easily lead people resonate efficiency will be higher.

　　10, seeking feedback

　　Information warfare as cannon unlike direct firefight on the matter. Is just the beginning of the information warfare to information warfare and special audiences like to communicate and send a message, collect audience feedback is also important. Our ways through face-to-face exchange of traditional and non-traditional media, hot phone, local coordination center to understand the effect of publicity action before.

　　Occupy the active role of information warfare

　　Although U.S. information warfare theory and structure such as defects, but our commanders at all levels must understand that occupy live active position in the information warfare is to win the key to fight the insurgency war. Fighting forces beyond the control of the battlefield of information warfare, that is to give up a tool may play a decisive role. The counterinsurgency war key point is to get the support of the people to information warfare is to provide support for the actions of tactical forces. Doing the same can also help the local government to expand its influence, and eventually allow people to give up the rebels, and support for the new government.

　　The operational and strategic headquarters of the U.S. military must actively promote information warfare resources allocated between the subordinate forces, able to clearly understand the intent of the superior field officers, so as more handy to commence the action, and occupied in the war in principle initiative. Must not be because of the lack of clarity of purpose and priority of resource use, and lead combat troops in the case of the overwhelming technical superiority cheaper but can not be accounted for in the information war. In short, information warfare is an important tactical behavior, each battalion of the U.S. military, company, platoon and squad even fire team, must take the initiative to participate boldly into it, to grasp the initiative in the information warfare, help us to adhere to in the end, get the final victory.

　　Author: U.S. Army Captain Leonardo J • Flor

　　Compile: Zhiyuan / Yishui Han

Source: http://mil.sohu.com/20101101/n216925503.shtml